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Abstract. We study the problem of determination of asset prices in an incomplete market
proposing three different but related scenarios. One scenario uses a market game approach
whereas the other two are based on risk sharing or regret minimizing considerations. Dynamical
schemes modeling the convergence of the buyer’s and of the seller’s prices to a unique price are
proposed.
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1. Introduction
Realistic markets are incomplete, due to either the existence of frictions or to the nonexistence
of the necessary assets needed to achieve the complete replication of any contingent claim by
linear combinations of available (traded) assets. Incomplete markets is a very interesting field
of economic theory and finance, which through seminal studies (see e.g. [7], [9] and [11]) has led
to important results that have helped the community to reach a deeper understanding of the
function of financial markets.
In this work we study the problem of determination of prices in an incomplete market. While
there is a rich literature on this field, the majority of these works focuses on the determination
of bounds on the prices that are consistent with general equilibrium considerations. It is well
known for instance, that in an incomplete market set up there is no longer a unique pricing kernel
(martingale measure) and the existence of more than one pricing kernel may at best point out
a whole band of prices that do not allow for arbitrage opportunities. The determination of a
single price, at which an asset will eventually be traded in this market, out of this whole band,
is still an open problem. There exists an extensive and very interesting literature on the subject,
focusing on the determination of the upper and lower hedging prices (see e.g. [9]) as well as a
number of suggestions on the price selected by the market (e.g. Kuhlback-Leibner or related
entropy minimization criteria [8], [14]) which lead to interesting implications, some of which
are testable with real market data, however, a complete theory of price selection in incomplete
markets is still missing.
The aim of the present paper is to contribute to this literature providing types of scenarios
on price selection in incomplete markets. The scenarios are based on behavioural considerations
and lead to interesting results. We present these scenarios within a one period model setting, so
that the basic concepts and underlying ideas are made clear and technical details are kept to a
minimum. Then the passage to a multiperiod model should follow without any major difficulty
and we plan to present it in future work together with the case of the continuous model.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the determination of the
upper and lower prices of a contingent claim in an incomplete market for risk averse agents via
utility pricing. Although this is not a new issue (see e.g. [6]), we include it here to fix ideas and
notation. In Section 3 we address the problem of the determination of one commonly accepted
price for the contingent claim with the use of three different scenarios. The first approach is a
market game approach, the second is a risk sharing approach whereas the third approach is one
in which the agents update their beliefs about the possible states of the world, in a way which is
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consistent with the minimization of total regret. In Section 4 we propose dynamic mechanisms
that may describe the bargaining procedure between the agents, leading to prices consistent with
any of the above scenarios, and we study their stability. Furthermore, we discuss the robustness
of the previously mentioned dynamical mechanisms with respect to uncertainty. In Section 5 we
summarize and conclude.
2. Non-arbitrage upper and lower prices via utility pricing
We consider a one period market model with N tradable assets a1, ..., aN and K states of
the world ω1, ..., ωK . One of the assets is a riskless asset with return rate r and without loss of
generality we may assume that this asset is a1. Let p = (p1, ..., pN ) denote the price vector of
the N assets at time t = 0, i.e. for each i = 1, ..., N we denote by pi the price at time t = 0 of
the asset ai. Let also D = (dij) i=1,...,K
j=1,...,N
denote the K × N matrix of the assets payoffs at time
t = 1, that is, dij denotes the value of the asset aj at time t = 1 when the prevailing state of the
world is ωi. In the sequel we may use the notation dj(ωi) instead of dij and we may write dj
to indicate the j−th column vector of D without these causing any confusion. We also assume
that the value of the riskless asset at time t = 1 is equal to 1 no matter what the prevailing state
of the world is, i.e. d1(ωi) = 1 for all i = 1, ...,K (clearly, p1 = 1/(1 + r)). Moreover, without
loss of generality, we assume that none of the assets a1, ..., aN is redundant, that is, none of
the columns of the payoff matrix D can be expressed as a linear combination of the remaining
columns of the matrix. Furthermore we assume that N < K, that is, we face an incomplete
markets situation where there are more states of the world than assets and thus the existing
assets are not enough to reproduce every possible contingent claim at time t = 1.
As it is known from the theory of mathematical finance, the incompleteness of the market
leads to the existence of an infinity of risk neutral measures, all of which are consistent with the
absence of arbitrage, that is, with general equilibrium theory.
LetM be the family of risk neutral measures. This family consists ofK–tuplesQ = (q1, ..., qK)
such that 0 < qi < 1 for all i = 1, ...,K and q1 + ...+ qK = 1, satisfying also the condition
r = q1
(
dj(ω1)− pj
pj
)
+ ...+ qK
(
dj(ωK)− pj
pj
)
for all j = 1, ..., N .
Any claim F at t = 1 that is contingent on the prevailing state will have price which is
consistent with the absence of arbitrage assumption
P =
1
1 + r
EQ[F ], Q ∈ M .
Therefore, each contingent claim may have an infinity of prices in a band, all of which are
consistent with the assumption of the absence of arbitrage in the market.
The question we wish to address in this paper is the following:
Out of this infinity of prices, which one will be actually realized?
In the absence of a unique risk neutral price for the asset, we resort to utility valuation. An
expected utility maximizing risk averse agent, who operates under some probability measure P ,
chooses a reservation price of the contingent claim (which in fact is a non-arbitrage price) in such
a way that she will be indifferent between either transacting or not transacting the contingent
claim. In general, the reservation price of the seller of the contingent claim is different than that
of the buyer of the contingent claim.
2.1. Allocation of wealth and indifference pricing. Assume that an agent’s preferences are
described by a smooth utility function U(·) such that U ′ > 0 (strict non-satiation) and U ′′ < 0
(strict risk aversion). These two properties guarantee the strict quasiconvexity of the utility
function (see. e.g. [13]).
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The agent desires to allocate her initial wealth in the market in a way that her expected
utility is maximized. Suppose that the agent will allocate her initial wealth W0 to the N assets
a1, ..., aN in proportions pi = (π1, ..., πN ), i.e. proportion πi of the initial wealth will be placed
in asset ai and π1 + ...+ πN = 1. The final wealth of this portfolio at time t = 1 is the random
variable W1 given by
W1 =

W0 ∑
j=1,...,N
πj
pj
dj(ωi)


i=1,...,K
.
The agent will choose pi so as to maximize E[U(W1)] where the expectation is taken under a
measure Q = (q1, ..., qK), reflecting the beliefs of the agent about the probabilities of occurrence
of the future states of the world. So qi denotes the perceived by the agent probability that the
state ωi will occur.
It is well known that under the assumptions made here this problem has a solution. Let pi∗
denote the solution to this maximization problem and let U∗ denote the resulting maximized
expected utility. Clearly both pi∗ and U∗ are functions of the probability measure Q and of the
initial wealth W0.
Assume now that the seller has initial wealth W S0 and preferences described by a utility
function US(·) and that she has issued a contingent claim with payoff to the buyer, at time
t = 1, given by the vector dN+1 = (dN+1(ωi))i=1,...,K. If the seller had not sold the contingent
claim, she would have allocated proportions piS = (πS1 , ..., π
S
N ) of her wealthW
S
0 to the N assets,
according to the previous discussion, in order to achieve maximum expected utility US∗ (W
S
0 ;Q
S)
under her perceived probability measure QS about the future states of the world.
Assume now that the seller decides to issue the contingent claim and receives the price pSN+1
at time t = 0. The seller desires now to invest her initial wealth W S0 +p
S
N+1 among the N assets
a1, ..., aN in proportions p¯i
S = (π¯S1 , ..., π¯
S
N ), i.e. proportion π¯
S
i of the initial wealth will be placed
in asset ai and π¯
S
1 + ...+ π¯
S
N = 1. The final wealth of this portfolio at time t = 1 is the random
variable W¯ S1 given by
W¯ S1 =

(W S0 + pSN+1) ∑
j=1,...,N
π¯Sj
pj
dj(ωi)− dN+1(ωi)


i=1,...,K
.
The seller will choose p¯iS so as to maximize E[US(W¯ S1 )], where the expectation is taken under the
measure QS = (qS1 , ..., q
S
K), reflecting the beliefs of the seller about the probabilities of occurrence
of the future states of the world. So qSi denotes the perceived by the seller probability that the
state ωi will occur
Let p¯iS∗ denote the solution to this maximization problem and let U¯
S
∗ denote the resulting
maximized expected utility. Clearly both p¯iS∗ and U¯
S
∗ are functions of the probability measure
QS , of the initial wealth W S0 + p
S
N+1 and of the random payoff of the liability undertaken by the
writer of the contingent claim dN+1. The seller of the contingent claim will choose a price for
this contract so that these two decisions leave her indifferent, i.e. she will choose a price pSN+1
as the solution of the equation
US∗ (W
S
0 ;Q
S) = U¯S∗ (W
S
0 + p
S
N+1, dN+1 ;Q
S) .
The solution of this equation will provide the seller’s indifference or reservation price of the
contingent claim.
Similarly, assume that the buyer has initial wealth WB0 and preferences described by a util-
ity function UB(·) and that she decided to buy the contingent claim with payoff to the buyer,
at time t = 1, given by the vector dN+1 = (dN+1(ωi))i=1,...,K. If the buyer had not bought the
4 L. BOUKAS, D. PINHEIRO, A. A. PINTO, S. Z. XANTHOPOULOS, AND A. N. YANNACOPOULOS
contingent claim, she would have allocated proportions piB = (πB1 , ..., π
B
N ) of her wealth W
B
0
to the N assets, according to the previous discussion, in order to achieve maximum expected
utility UB∗ (W
B
0 ;Q
B) under her perceived probability measure QB about the future states of the
world.
Assume now that the buyer bought the contingent claim for a price pBN+1 at time t = 0.
The buyer desires now to invest her initial wealth WB0 − p
B
N+1 among the N assets a1, ..., aN in
proportions p¯iB = (π¯B1 , ..., π¯
B
N ), that is, proportion π¯
B
i of this wealth will be placed in asset ai
and π¯B1 + ... + π¯
B
N = 1. The final wealth of this portfolio at time t = 1 is the random variable
W¯B1 given by
W¯B1 =

(WB0 − pBN+1) ∑
j=1,...,N
π¯Bj
pj
dj(ωi) + dN+1(ωi)


i=1,...,K
.
The buyer will choose p¯iB so as to maximize E[UB(W¯B1 )], where the expectation is taken under
the measure QB = (qB1 , ..., q
B
K), reflecting the beliefs of the buyer about the probabilities of
occurrence of the future states of the world. So qBi denotes the perceived by the buyer probability
that the state ωi will occur.
Let p¯iB∗ denote the solution to this maximization problem and let U¯
B
∗ (W
B
0 −p
B
N+1, dN+1; Q
B)
denote the resulting maximized expected utility. Clearly both p¯iB∗ and U¯
B
∗ are functions of the
probability measure QB , of the initial wealth WB0 + p
B
N+1 and of the contingent claim dN+1.
Similarly, as in the case of the seller, the buyer will choose her price so that she will stay
indifferent between buying or not buying the contingent claim contract. The price pBN+1 will be
given as the solution of the algebraic equation
UB∗ (W
B
0 ;Q
B) = U¯B∗ (W
B
0 − p
B
N+1, dN+1; Q
B) .
Assuming that such a solution exists, it is called the indifference or reservation price for the buyer
of the contingent claim contract. In general, when markets are incomplete, the reservation price
of a contingent claim for the seller and the reservation price of the same contingent claim for
the buyer do not coincide.
3. Three scenarios for price selection
From the above we see that in general the buyer and the seller of the contingent claim may
end up with different valuations of the contingent claim. The buyer has her own valuation of the
contingent claim PB = p
B
N+1 = PB(Q
B), which is implicitly defined by the relation UB∗ = U¯
B
∗
for some probability measure QB. Similarly, the seller has her own valuation of the contingent
claim PS = p
S
N+1 = PS(Q
S), which is implicitly defined by the relation US∗ = U¯
S
∗ for some
probability measure QS . These valuations reflect the beliefs of the two agents about the future
states of the world and their degrees of risk aversion. The two agents may be thought as not
taking any risk at these valuations with regard to their expected utilities. At this point both
the seller and the buyer are unaware of each others valuation.
In this section we propose three different but interrelated scenarios under which the buyer
and the seller will eventually agree on a common price for the contingent claim contract, at
which the trade will take place.
3.1. Market games approach. We have assumed that the two agents will eventually reach a
price agreement and we want to explore the basic scenarios under which this can be achieved. We
also assume that the two agents are impatient. Impatience leads them to act (even momentarily)
as if they are entering a one bid sealed-auction and within this framework we consider that their
objective is minimization of maximum regret (according to Linhart [10] in the minimax regret
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case there exists a unique strategy, in contrast to the case of maximization of profit objective,
which is a generalization of the linear equilibrium of Chatterjee-Samuelson [4]).
Let PB denote the value of the contingent claim to the buyer and similarly, let PS denote the
value of the contingent claim to the seller. We assume that the support of the buyer’s prior as
to the distribution of PB is [α, β], equal to the support of the seller’s prior as to the distribution
of PS . Let P˜B = PB(Q˜
B) be the intended bid price of the buyer and P˜S = PS(Q˜
S) be the
intended ask price of the seller. Trade occurs if and only if P˜B ≥ P˜S . If trade occurs, the price
is P = P˜B+P˜S2 . Thus the buyer’s profit is ΠB = PB −
P˜B+P˜S
2 if P˜B ≥ P˜S , otherwise it is zero.
On the other hand the seller’s profit is ΠS =
P˜B+P˜S
2 − PS if P˜B ≥ P˜S , otherwise it is zero. Let
Π∗B = maxP˜B ΠB be the maximum profit of the buyer (i.e. the best the buyer could have done,
had he known the seller’s ask) and let RB = Π
∗
B − ΠB be the maximum regret of the buyer,
and similarly for the seller. Following Linhart [10], and considering minimization of maximum
regret, the two agents will make their offers:
P˜B =
{
PB α ≤ PB ≤ α+
1
4(β − α)
2
3PB +
1
12(β − α) α+
1
4(β − α) ≤ PB ≤ β
P˜S =
{
2
3PS +
1
4 (β − α) α ≤ PS ≤ α+
3
4 (β − α)
PS α+
3
4 (β − α) ≤ PS ≤ β
If PB − PS ≥
β−α
4 then P˜B ≥ P˜S and therefore a trade is achieved at the price P =
P˜B+P˜S
2
while at the same time both the buyer and the seller have minimized their maximum regret and
they have concluded the deal in just one step. Of course they have both achieved a better price
than their initial valuations since P ≤ PB and P ≥ PS .
If however PB − PS <
β−α
4 then P˜B < P˜S and the trade is not achieved at this first step.
However, considering that P˜B and P˜S are one to one functions of PB and PS , respectively,
each agent can work out the initial valuation of her counterparty, that is, the buyer obtains
knowledge of PS and the seller obtains knowledge of PB . By doing so they will encounter one
of the following two possibilities:
PB ≥ PS
PB < PS
In the first case, when PB ≥ PS , they will split the difference between their initial valuations,
and the resulting price will be PB+PS2 and the trade will conclude. Again they will have both
achieved a better price than their initial valuations since PB+PS2 ≤ PB and
PB+PS
2 ≥ PS and
their maximum regret will be zero. It is worth noting here that up to now the risk aversion
characteristics of the two agents have not entered the bargaining procedure. Nevertheless, they
have already been taken into account when the initial valuations PB and PS were first determined
by the buyer and the seller, respectively. In the second case, when PB < PS , no trade is possible
unless the two agents either decide to undertake some risk or to update their beliefs. These two
interesting scenarios will be dealt in the following sections.
3.2. The risk sharing approach. Another scenario for the price determination in an incom-
plete market is the scenario of optimal risk sharing. In this scenario we assume that the trans-
action of the contingent claim has to take place necessarily. In this case the agents are obliged
to take the risk associated with the contract and the best they can do is to choose the price
that guarantees that both the buyer and the seller undertake the minimum risk. This will yield
a unique price for the contingent claim, under standard assumptions on the utility functions of
the buyer and the seller.
We present a version of this scenario in this section.
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Suppose that the seller and the buyer have beliefs about the future states of the world QS and
QB , respectively, so that the contingent claim indifference price of the buyer is lower than that
of the seller. Then there will be no trade unless each of the agents decides to undertake some
risk. For each agent we will quantify risk as the difference of the maximum expected utility of
the wealth while holding the long or short position in the contingent claim and the maximum
expected utility of the wealth without the contingent claim.
Let UA∗ (W
A;QA) be the maximum expected utility of an agent A that has not undertaken
any position on the contingent claim, where WA is the initial wealth of the agent and QA is the
probability measure reflecting the beliefs of the agent about the future states of the world. Let us
now assume that the seller issues the contingent claim at an initial price PS while simultaneously
adopting a position in the underlying market so that she maximizes her expected utility. In this
case the maximum expected utility achieved is equal to U¯S∗ (W
S + PS , dN+1;Q
S). If the seller
decides to undertake risk ǫS then the price PS corresponding to this risk position will be given
by the solution of the equation
US∗ (W
S ;QS)− U¯S∗ (W
S + PS , dN+1;Q
S) = ǫS .
We will denote the solution of this algebraic equation by PS(ǫS). This depends on the risk
undertaken as well as on the beliefs on the future states of the world. Note that PS(0) is the
indifference price for the seller.
Let us now assume that the buyer buys the contingent claim at an initial price PB while
simultaneously adopting a position in the underlying market so that she maximizes her expected
utility. The maximum utility is then U¯B∗ (W
B−PB, dN+1;Q
B). If the buyer decides to undertake
risk ǫB then the price PB corresponding to this risk position will be given by the solution of the
equation
UB∗ (W
B ;QB)− U¯B∗ (W
B − PB , dN+1;Q
B) = ǫB
We will denote the solution of this algebraic equation by PB(ǫB). This also depends on the risk
undertaken as well as on the beliefs on the future states of the world. Note that PB(0) is the
indifference price for the buyer.
In the next lemma we summarize some properties of the functions PS(ǫS) and PB(ǫB).
Lemma 3.1. Assume that the seller and the buyer make their decisions with expected utility
functions US(W ) = E[uS(W )] and U
B(W ) = E[uB(W )], respectively. Furthermore, assume
that ui
′ > 0 and u′′i < 0 for i = S,B.
Then,
(i) PS is strictly decreasing and strictly quasiconcave in ǫS.
(ii) PB is strictly increasing and strictly quasiconvex in ǫB.
(iii) The function PS(ǫS)− PB(ǫB) is strictly quasiconcave.
Proof. (i) According to the results of [6], under our assumptions for the utility function, the
portfolio optimization problem has a unique solution and the maximum expected utility of the
seller U¯S∗ (w, dN+1;Q
S) is a strictly increasing function of its first argument w. According to the
definition of PS(ǫS) we see that
US∗ (w;Q
S)− U¯S∗ (w + PS(ǫS), dN+1;Q
S) = ǫS (3.1)
Take two values of risk undertaken ǫS > ǫ
′
S . Using the definition of PS(ǫS) and PS(ǫ
′
S), respec-
tively, we obtain that
US∗ (w + PS(ǫS), dN+1;Q
S)− US∗ (w + PS(ǫ
′
S), dN+1;Q
S) = −(ǫS − ǫ
′
S) < 0
Since USs (w, dN+1;Q
S) is strictly increasing in w the above inequality guarantees that PS(ǫS) <
PS(ǫ
′
S), so that PS is strictly decreasing.
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We now show that PS(ǫS) is strictly quasiconcave. Taking the convex combination of (3.1) at
ǫS and ǫ
′
S, respectively, we find that
λU¯S∗ (w + PS(ǫS)) + (1− λ)U¯
S
∗ (w + PS(ǫ
′
S)) = U¯
S
∗ (w + PS(λǫS + (1− λ)ǫ
′
S)) (3.2)
where to make the notation simpler we have suppressed the dependence of the indirect utility
function to the liability and the measure and kept explicitly only the dependence on the initial
wealth.
Suppose now that PS(ǫS) > PS(ǫ
′
S). Then, by the strict monotonicity of the indirect utility
function U¯S∗ (w) we obtain that U¯
S
∗ (w + PS(ǫS)) > U¯
S
∗ (w + PS(ǫ
′
S)) so that
U¯S∗ (w + PS(ǫ
′
S)) < λU¯
S
∗ (w + PS(ǫS)) + (1− λ)U¯
S
∗ (w + PS(ǫ
′
S))
< U¯S∗ (w + PS(ǫS)) (3.3)
Using equation (3.2) we see that (3.3) implies that
U¯S∗ (w + PS(ǫ
′
S)) < U¯
S
∗ (w + PS(λǫS + (1− λ)ǫ
′
S)) < U¯
S
∗ (w + PS(ǫS)) (3.4)
so that by the monotonicity of the indirect utility function we observe that PS(λǫS + (1 −
λ)ǫ′S) > PS(ǫ
′
S). Therefore PS(λǫS + (1− λ)ǫ
′
S) > min(PS(ǫS), PS(ǫ
′
S)), which implies the strict
quasiconcavity of PS(ǫS).
The proof of (ii) is similar taking into account that the position of the buyer is the opposite
than that of the seller. Finally (iii) follows easily from (i) and (ii). 
We may define the total risk undertaken by both agents by the convex combination
R(ǫS , ǫB) := λǫS + (1− λ)ǫB .
If λ ∈ (0, 1) this corresponds to sharing the total risk undertaken by the agents in the proportion
λ/(1− λ).
We then define the price of the contingent claim by the solution of the following optimization
problem
min
(ǫS ,ǫB)
λǫS + (1− λ)ǫB
subject to the constraint (3.5)
PS(ǫS) ≤ PB(ǫB)
If this problem has a unique solution (ǫ∗S , ǫ
∗
B) this would lead to a unique price PS(ǫ
∗
S) =
PB(ǫ
∗
B). The solution of this problem is formally equivalent to the solution of the expenditure
minimization problem and thus the prices PS(ǫ
∗
S) and PB(ǫ
∗
B) present an interesting analogy to
the determination of the Hicksian demand function.
As we shall see, a closely related problem to the risk sharing problem is the following “dual”
problem
max
ǫS ,ǫB
PB(ǫB)− PS(ǫS)
subject to the constraint (3.6)
λǫS + (1− λ)ǫB ≤ w
The solution of the dual problem (3.6) deals with the problem of maximizing the stated price
difference between the buyer and the seller under the constraint of undertaking a prespecified
total amount of risk w. The maximization of the price difference ensures the possibility of
successful trading of the asset. The properties of the functions PB(ǫB) and PS(ǫS) will guarantee
that the maximum is obtained at PB(ǫB) = PS(ǫS).
The following proposition shows that these optimization problems admit unique solutions and
sheds some light to their properties.
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Proposition 3.2. Under the conditions of Lemma 3.1 the following statements hold for the
optimization problem (3.5):
(i) Problem (3.5) has a unique solution which will be denoted as (ǫ∗B(λ), ǫ
∗
S(λ)).
(ii) The function ǫ∗B(λ) is nonincreasing in λ ∈ (0, 1) whereas the function ǫ
∗
S(λ) is nondecreasing
in λ ∈ (0, 1).
(iii) On the optimal risk bearing allocation PS(ǫS) = PB(ǫB).
Proof. The optimization problem (3.5) is formally equivalent to the expenditure minimization
problem in consumer theory and inherits most of its properties (see e.g. [13]). The existence of
the solution comes simply from the nonemptyness of the constraint set
B = {(ǫB , ǫS) ∈ R
2
+ | PB(ǫB)− PS(ǫS) ≥ 0} .
This follows by continuity of PB(ǫB) and PS(ǫS).
The uniqueness of the solution comes from the strict convexity of the “utility function”
U(ǫB , ǫS) = PB(ǫB)− PS(ǫS), which is guaranteed by Lemma 3.1.
We may further observe other properties of the optimal risk sharing allocation. The optimal
risk undertaken by the seller ǫ∗S(λ) is a nondecreasing function of λ whereas the optimal risk
undertaken by the buyer ǫ∗B(λ) is a nonincreasing function of λ. This comes out easily from the
continuity and monotonicity properties of the inverse of the utility functions we are using.
Finally, the local non-satiation property of the “utility function” U(ǫB, ǫS) guarantees that
at the optimal risk sharing allocation PS(ǫS) = PB(ǫB). 
We may also see through standard duality arguments that the solutions of problems (3.5) and
(3.6) are related in the following sense:
Proposition 3.3. (i) Given the risk sharing rule λ, let (ǫ∗B, ǫ
∗
S) be a solution of problem (3.5)
such that ∆P = PB(ǫ
∗
B)−PS(ǫ
∗
S) ≥ 0. Define R = λǫ
∗
B + (1− λ)ǫ
∗
S. If R > minλǫB + (1− λ)ǫS
then (ǫ∗B , ǫ
∗
S) is a solution to problem (3.6) given (λ,R). For this solution of problem (3.6) we
obtain that max{PB(ǫB)− PS(ǫS)} = 0.
(ii) If (ǫ¯B , ǫ¯S) is a solution to problem (3.6) given (λ,R) then (ǫ¯B , ǫ¯S) solves problem (3.5)
subject to the constraint PB(ǫB)− PS(ǫS) ≥ PB(ǫ¯B)− PS(ǫ¯S).
For the particular problem at hand, for which the price functions are differentiable, the
calculation of the optimal risk beared will be given by the first order conditions
λ ≥ −µ
dPS
dǫS
(1− λ) ≥ µ
dPB
dǫB
ǫS
(
λ+ µ
dPS
dǫS
)
+ ǫB
(
(1− λ)− µ
dPB
dǫB
)
= 0
for some µ ≥ 0.
3.3. Optimal choice of the agents market price of risk. In this class of scenarios we
assume that each of the agents has an idea about the possible states of the world QB and QS,
respectively, but their beliefs are not “rigid” in the sense that whey are willing to change their
attitudes by observing the other agents. This is in contrast with the situation we described in
the previous scenario, where each agent had a rigid belief about the possible value of the states of
the world. We assume that each agent will choose the utility indifference price for the asset using
as probability measure for the definition of the expected utility the “personalized” measure that
corresponds to her own beliefs. Therefore, assuming her beliefs are correct, she will not incur
any losses (defined in the sense of utility of final wealth). However, for generic choice of QB and
QS , the utility prices of the buyer and the seller will not coincide, thus leading to impossibility
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of trade. We assume that the agents, for some reasons, are determined to trade the contingent
claim. Therefore, the agents review their attitudes towards the states of the world and adopt
new beliefs QS, QB so that their new indifference prices will become equal. Since the agents are
flexible about their beliefs we assume that they fully trust their new attitudes towards states of
the world and the new indifference prices incur no risk for either of the two agents.
Summarizing:
• Each agent starts with her beliefs QB and QS about the states of the world
• They state their indifference prices PS(Q
S) and PB(Q
B) under their beliefs about the
states of the world. These prices incur no risk (with regard to expected utility)
• In general PS(Q
S) 6= PB(Q
B)
• The agents update their beliefs about states of the world and state their new indifference
prices
• The process continues until the agents adopt beliefs such that PS(Q
S) = PB(Q
B)
The above procedure will in principle lead to a price such that PS(Q
S) = PB(Q
B). However,
this price is still any price within the band of prices defined by the upper and lower hedging
prices. In what follows we propose some scenarios that may lead to a unique price for the asset
within this band.
Consider now the following argument: the seller of the asset will of course wish to obtain at
least the price that corresponds to her beliefs about the future states of the world QS = Q. By
changing her belief to some new QS the seller compromises to give away the potential “extra”
profit corresponding to Q−QS. On the other hand, the buyer of the asset would wish to obtain
at most the price that corresponds to her beliefs about the future states of the world QB = Q. By
changing her belief to some new QB the buyer compromises to give away the potential “extra”
profit corresponding to QB −Q. The quantity λ(Q−QS) + (1− λ)(QB −Q) can be considered
as the total potential loss of the two agents, where the parameter λ gives us information on the
way that this “loss” is divided between the two agents. In the case λ = 1/2 the loss is equally
divided between the agents. In the case λ = 0 the buyer suffers all the potential loss, whereas
in the case λ = 1 the seller suffers all the potential loss. We have to stress here that this loss
is the potential loss in the sense that it is the loss that the agents will suffer if they are unable
to persuade the others to adopt their beliefs. In practice, since the agents are willing to fully
adopt their new beliefs as the correct beliefs about the world and choose their prices by utility
indifference pricing according to the new beliefs, there is no actual loss. That is why we call the
loss, “potential loss”.
We may consider now the case where the agents update their beliefs so that the total potential
loss is minimized. This would correspond to choosing QS , QB so that
min
QS ,QB
λdS(Q−Q
S) + (1− λ)dB(Q
B −Q)
subject to the constraint (3.7)
PS(Q
S) ≤ PB(Q
B)
which would in turn lead to a price for the asset. In the above problem, dB and dS are distance
functions in the unit simplex ∆K quantifying the buyer’s and seller’s regret, respectively.
It is again interesting to consider the dual problem of (3.7). This can be written as
max
QS ,QB
PB(Q
B)− PS(Q
S)
subject to the constraint (3.8)
λdS(Q−Q
S) + (1− λ)dB(Q
B −Q) ≤ w
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Problem (3.8) corresponds to the maximization of the difference of the prices stated by the
buyer and by the seller (so that trade is ensured) under the constraint of undertaking less than
a fixed amount of total regret. The solution of problems (3.8) and (3.7) are related.
We assume that the beliefs QS of the seller corresponds to some QˆS ∈ M such that PS(Q
S) =
E
QˆS
[F ∗] =: PˆS(Qˆ
S), and similarly for the buyer. Within this context we may rewrite problems
(3.7) and (3.8) in terms of the (linear) price functions PˆS(Qˆ
S) and PˆB(Qˆ
B) and the risk neutral
measures QˆS and QˆB . One may argue that within this context, the distance from a reference
risk neutral measure may make more sense as regret. This is since the measures Qˆ ∈ M have
more economic meaning, in terms of the marginal utility of consumption in the different states
of the world, than the measures Q quantifying the beliefs of the agents.
The following hold for both P (Q) and Pˆ (Qˆ).
Lemma 3.4. (i) The price PB(Q
B) is a continuous function of QB ∈ ∆K and achieves a
minimum value PB and a maximum value PB.
(ii) The price PS(Q
S) is a continuous function of QS ∈ ∆K and achieves a minimum value PS
and a maximum value PS.
(iii) If [PB , PB ] ∩ [PS , P S] 6= ∅ then there exist Q
B , QS ∈ ∆K such that PB(Q
B) ≥ PS(Q
S).
Proof. (i) The maximum theorem of Berge (see e.g. [2]) guarantees the continuity of the function
U¯B∗ (W
B
0 − PB , dN+1;Q
B) = sup
θ
K∑
i=1
qBi U
B(WB0 − PB + dN+1(ωi) + θ ·∆G(ωi)),
with respect to the parameters QB = (qB1 , ..., q
B
K) ∈ ∆
K . In the above, by
∆G(ωi) = (∆G1(ωi), ...,∆GN (ωi)) , i = 1, ...,K ,
we denote the gains from the assets in the state of the world ωi. The price PB(Q
B) for the case
where the buyer adopts the “beliefs” QB , is obtained as the solution of the equation
U¯B∗ (W
B
0 − PB(Q
B), dN+1;Q
B) = UB∗ (W
B
0 ;Q
B)
By the continuity properties of the inverse function, we obtain continuity of PB(Q
B) with respect
to QB ∈ ∆K . Since ∆K is a compact set, by Weierstrass theorem we obtain that PB(Q
B)
achieves a maximum and a minimum value in ∆K .
(ii) Follows along similar lines as (i).
(iii) Follows by continuity of the functions PB(Q
B) and PS(Q
S). 
Using the above lemma, we may prove the existence of a price that minimizes the total regret
of the buyer and the seller.
Proposition 3.5. Assume further that the functions PB(Q
B) and PS(Q
S) are strictly convex.
Then, the following statements hold:
(i) There exists a unique solution to the minimization problem (3.7).
(ii) The unique choice of the agents beliefs QS and QB corresponds to a unique price PS(Q
S) =
PB(Q
B).
(iii) The maximization problem (3.8) has an unique solution.
The assumption of strict convexity is quite natural for certain classes of utility functions. For
instance, if the agents make their decisions using exponential utility functions (not necessar-
ily with the same risk aversion coefficient) then detailed calculations show that the functions
PB(Q
B) and PS(Q
S) are expressed in terms of combinations of linear and logarithmic functions
which may be shown to be strictly convex.
The regret minimizing scenario may be generalized as follows. Consider that the agents work
entirely in terms of the stated prices so that they update their prices directly rather than through
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their beliefs about the states of the world. The regret of the buyer and the seller may then be
expressed as their divergence from the minimum and maximum price, respectively. Therefore,
the total regret of the buyer and seller may be expressed as the convex combination
R = λφB(PB − PB) + (1− λ)φS(P S − PS) ,
where φB(x) and φS(x) are functions modeling the regret of the buyer and the seller, respectively,
as a function of the deviation of the stated price from the preferred prices which are PB for
the buyer and PS for the seller. These functions are considered as increasing functions of their
argument. One possible choice for these functions may be the linear function, however, one
may give these regret functions the same properties as utility functions, that is, they may be
considered as increasing concave functions.
The problem of agreeing to a common price for the contingent claim may then be expressed
as the optimization problem
min
(PB ,PS)∈A
λφB(PB − PB) + (1− λ)φS(PS − PS)
subject to
PB − PS ≥ 0
where A = [PB, PB] × [PS , PS ]. Assuming strict convexity of the regret function we may
guarantee that the above problem leads to a unique common price.
Proposition 3.6. Assume that φB and φS are strictly convex increasing functions. Then, the
regret minimization problem has a unique solution.
4. Dynamic mechanisms for price selection and robustness with respect to
uncertainty
In the previous section we have proposed certain scenarios that lead to the choice of a price
for an asset in an incomplete market. However, the above scenarios give a characterization of the
static problem of choosing the final price of the asset. In this section we address the problem of
the dynamics that will lead the agents to the adoption of the price in which the asset will finally
be traded, which may be the one proposed by either of the above types of scenarios. Therefore,
in this section we propose dynamic mechanisms by which the trading will take place.
For the sake of concreteness and brevity let us only consider dynamic mechanisms in the
context of scenarios of the type presented in section 3.2. The same arguments may be easily
generalized in the study of dynamic mechanisms for other types of scenarios e.g. those of section
3.3.
Consider the following situation: The agents will have to complete their transactions on the
contingent claim by period 0 of the model. At time 0− the agents enter in a trading ’game’
which may consist of several periods, the objective of which is that the agents update their
attitudes towards risk so that they arrive at a single price. We will denote by ǫB(n) and ǫS(n)
the amount of risk undertaken by the buyer and the seller of the contingent claim, respectively,
at the n trading period.
The risk updating scheme is given by a dynamical system of the form
ǫS(n+ 1) = ǫS(n) + f1(ǫS(n), ǫB(n))(PS(ǫS)− PB(ǫB))
ǫB(n+ 1) = ǫB(n) + f2(ǫS(n), ǫB(n))(PS(ǫS)− PB(ǫB)) ,
where f1(ǫS(n), ǫB(n)) and f2(ǫS(n), ǫB(n)) correspond to the velocity of update of the risk
undertaken by each agent and will be specified later on. Their exact forms correspond to
behavioural assumptions on the way that the agents update the risk they are willing to undertake,
by observing the amount of risk undertaken by the other agent as induced by the prices stated.
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To simplify the analysis further, we assume that the time scales at which the bargaining
is made at period 0− are very short, and at any rate negligible compared to the time period
between T = 0 and T = 1. This implies that we may approximate the above dynamical system
by a differential equation of the form
dǫS
dt
= f1(ǫS(t), ǫB(t))(PS(ǫS(t)) − PB(ǫB(t)))
dǫB
dt
= f2(ǫS(t), ǫB(t))(PS(ǫS(t)) − PB(ǫB(t)))
where now by ǫB(t) and ǫS(t) we denote the amount of risk undertaken by the agents at the
trading period t.
By proper choice of the functions f1 and f2 we may guarantee the convergence of the above
dynamical trading scheme to a single price for the asset. The following proposition provides
conditions under which this convergence is guaranteed.
Proposition 4.1. Assume that the inequality
λ :=
∂PS
∂ǫS
f1 +
∂PB
∂ǫB
f2 ≤ −ǫ (4.1)
holds for some positive ǫ.
Then, the solution of the dynamical trading scheme converges to PS(ǫS) = PB(ǫB).
Proof. It is straightforward to observe that
d
dt
(PS − PB) =
(
∂PS
∂ǫS
f1 +
∂PB
∂ǫB
f2
)
(PS − PB) .
If x = PS − PB we see that x satisfies the differential inequality
dx
dt
≤ −ǫx
which, by the Gronwall inequality, guarantees that PS → PB as t→∞. 
A large number of risk updating schemes satisfy this condition. Different dynamic mechanisms
may be obtained depending on behavioural assumptions. One example might be the steepest
descend algorithm, guaranteeing the fastest descent to the isopricing manifold PS(ǫS) = PB(ǫB).
Example 1. Assume that
f1 = −
∂PS
∂ǫS
, f2 =
∂PB
∂ǫB
.
This corresponds to a risk undertaking scheme according to which the seller undertakes risk
proportionally to the sensitivity of her price with respect to changes in ǫS, and proportionally to
the difference between the stated prices of seller and buyer, while the buyer undertakes risk with
a similar scheme. Then gradually the seller price lowers while the buyer price increases until
these two prices meet at PS(ǫS) = PB(ǫB).
The properties of the price function PS(ǫS) and PB(ǫB) (see Lemma 3.1) show that condition
(4.1) holds, so that according to Proposition 4.1 the convergence to the single price PS(ǫS) =
PB(ǫB) is guaranteed.
The convergence dynamics to the isopricing manifold (i.e. to one price for the buyer and the
seller that coincide) may be explicitly studied in certain cases of interest, e.g. in the case where
the buyer’s and the seller’s prices are chosen via indifference pricing using exponential utility
functions (see e.g. [15]).
The above risk updating scheme guarantees that buyer and seller arrive at a single price
but does not necessarily guarantee that this is the optimal risk sharing price. This can be done
through a dynamical scheme that may approximate the solution of the optimal risk sharing price.
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To this end we may approximate the original optimization problem (3.5) with an unconstrained
problem, with the use of an entropic barrier method (see e.g. [3]). According to this method we
may approximate problem (3.5) by the unconstrained problem
min
ǫB,ǫS
λǫB + (1− λ)ǫS −
1
h
log(PB(ǫB)− PS(ǫS))
for arbitrary h > 0, which is related to the order of approximation of the original problem. As
is easily seen, the objective function becomes infinite when the constraint PB(ǫB) ≥ PS(ǫS) is
not met. A gradient method may then be applied for the solution of this problem, which may
be treated as a risk updating scheme. For instance, assuming for ease of notation continuous
time updating, we may consider the dynamical scheme
dǫB
dt
= s
(
λ−
1
PB − PS
∂PB
∂ǫB
)
dǫS
dt
= s
(
(1− λ) +
1
PB − PS
∂PS
∂ǫS
)
for some s > 0. This scheme will drive us to a common price for buyer and seller with the
minimum aggregate risk. To see that, take first the case where PB < PS , i.e. the case where
no trade is possible. Then PB − PS < 0 and since
∂PB
∂ǫB
> 0 we see that dǫBdt > 0 so the buyer
will undertake more risk. This will raise the buyer’s price. Similarly, since ∂PS
∂ǫS
< 0 we see that
dǫS
dt > 0 so the seller will also undertake more risk and this will lower the seller’s price. As a
result the two agents will finally tend towards PB ≃ PS . In the case where PB > PS , we may
easily observe that the “forces” will reverse and will be such that both agent start undertaking
less risk until the minimum aggregate risk is obtained. This simplistic hand waving argument
may be turned into a rigorous mathematical proof of convergence. What is important, is to
observe that such arguments allow us to provide further behavioural rules according to which a
unique price for a contingent claim in an incomplete market may be obtained.
The above dynamical schemes may be generalized using the notion of projected dynamical
systems, widely used in the theory of optimization. We only introduce the concept here with a
simple example and intend to return to this issue in the near future. We see by the properties
of the risk sharing solution (see Proposition 3.2) that the risk sharing price will be obtained by
the solution of the fixed point equation PS(ǫS)− PB(ǫB) = 0 under the constraint (ǫS , ǫB) ∈ K
where K = {(ǫS , ǫB) | λǫS + (1 − λ)ǫB ≤ w, λ ∈ [0, 1]}. In other words, it is the solution of
a fixed point scheme constrained to take values in a closed convex set. This brings us to the
situation of a number of problems studied by Flam (see e.g. [5]). According to his results, the
solution to the problem may be written in the equivalent form
x = PK[x+ (PS(x)− PB(x))] ,
where x = (ǫS , ǫB) and PK is the orthogonal projection onto the closed convex set K. The intro-
duction of the projection operator ensures that the constraint is satisfied. The formulation given
above for the fixed point may be turned into a dynamical system scheme for the determination
of such fixed point. In discrete time, this dynamical scheme may be written as
xn+1 = PK[xn + sn(PS(xn)− PB(xn))] ,
where sn is a sequence of properly selected step sizes. Under proper choices of the step sizes
sequence {sn} the dynamical scheme will converge to the equilibrium PS(x) = PB(x). In a
continuous time approximation this scheme becomes
dx
dt
= Λ{PK[x− α(PS(x)− PB(x))]− x}
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for Λ and α positive constants. This projected dynamical system can be shown to be globally
asymptotically stable under certain conditions.
Another choice could be the projected gradient dynamical system
dx
dt
= Λ{PK[x− α gradR(x)]− x} ,
where R(x) is the regret function we wish to minimize. Let us for example consider the projected
gradient dynamical system that may drive the system to the minimum total regret in the case
where we study the problem of regret minimization in the space of prices rather than in the
space of beliefs or risks. In this case, x = (P1, P2) = (PS , PB), and the convex subset K =
{(P1, P2) ∈ R
2 | P1 ≥ P2}. The projection operator onto this set is the linear operator
πK =
1
2
(
1 1
1 1
)
1{P1<P2} + I1{P1≥P2} .
The projected gradient system then becomes
dP1
dt
= −
α
2
(P1 − P2) +
α
2
(R′1 −R
′
2)
dP2
dt
=
α
2
(P1 − P2) +
α
2
(R′1 −R
′
2)
when P1 < P2 and
dP1
dt
= −
α
2
R′1
dP2
dt
=
α
2
R′2
when P1 ≥ P2, for some positive constant α. This projected gradient system can be shown to
converge exponentially fast to the minimal regret, using Lyapunov function techniques similar
to those used in Proposition 4.1 and the properties of the projection operator onto convex sets.
We refrain from giving a rigorous proof, which could follow along the lines of [1].
However, it is interesting to look at it from the behavioural point of view. The system of
prices updates requires not only knowledge of the stated prices of the two agents, which of course
are readily accessible in the bargaining process, but also some knowledge of the preferences of
the two agents (which is modeled by the gradient of the regret function). One may easily argue
that agent 1 may know her regret function R1 but not necessarily the regret function R2 of the
other agent. In this respect, schemes like the above, even though they guarantee convergence to
an optimal price may not be appropriate, unless treated in a fashion that includes uncertainty
about the preferences of the other agent.
An obvious question that comes to mind is the robustness of the above mechanisms with
respect to uncertainty as to the strategy for price update followed. In order to provide prelim-
inary results to this question we will assume that the above mentioned dynamical mechanisms
are perturbed by the presence of noise terms that model the possible uncertainty with respect
to the strategy followed by the buyer and the seller. For the sake of simplicity and to keep the
technicalities to the minimum possible, we will assume that uncertainty may be modeled by the
introduction of Brownian motion terms.
We will show that some of the mechanisms proposed may be robust in the presence of noise.
In the presence of noise, the dynamical scheme for risk selection takes the form
dǫS(t) = f1(PS − PB)dt+ σ1(PS − PB)dW (t)
dǫB(t) = f2(PS − PB)dt+ σ2(PS − PB)dW (t) ,
where dW (t) are the increments of a standard Brownian motion which, without loss of generality,
is taken to be one dimensional.
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The basic concern of this section is the following question:
Under which conditions the above stochastic risk updating mechanism converges
to a common price for the buyer and the seller of the asset?
The following proposition offers an answer to this question.
Proposition 4.2. Let
R1 :=
∂PS
∂ǫS
f1 −
∂PB
∂ǫB
f2
R2 =
1
2
{
∂2PS
∂ǫ2S
σ21 −
∂2PB
∂ǫ2B
σ22
}
R3 :=
{
∂PS
∂ǫS
σ1 −
∂PB
∂ǫB
σ2
}
Suppose that R2 ≤ 0 and that there exist K, ρ,Σ > 0 such that | R1 |≤ K as well as that
Σ ≤ R23 ≤ Σ for all ǫS, ǫB.
Then, if ρ > K + Σ2 the trivial solution PS = PB is almost surely exponentially stable, i.e.
almost all sample paths of the solution will tend to the equilibrium PS = PB exponentially fast.
Proof. Using Itoˆ’s formula we find that
d(PS − PB) =
{
∂PS
∂ǫS
f1 −
∂PB
∂ǫB
f2
}
(PS − PB)dt
+
1
2
{
∂2PS
∂ǫ2S
σ21 −
∂2PB
∂ǫ2B
σ22
}
(PS − PB)
2dt
+
{
∂PS
∂ǫS
σ1 −
∂PB
∂ǫB
σ2
}
(PS − PB)dW (t)
or if we define x = PS −PB the stochastic evolution for the difference of the seller’s and buyer’s
price satisfies
dx(t) = f(t, x(t))dt+ g(t, x(t))dW (t) , (4.2)
where
f(t, x(t)) := R1x(t) +R2x(t)
2
g(t, x(t)) := R3x(t)
with R1, R2 and R3 defined as in the statement of the Proposition.
Consider the Lyapunov function V (x, t) =| x |2. Then the following hold for the action of the
infinitesimal generator L of the diffusion process (4.2) on V
LV (x, t) = 2(R1x+R2x
2)x+R23x
2 ≤ 2R1x
2 +R23x
2 ≤ (2K +Σ)x2
| Vx(x, t)g(t, x) |
2= 4R23x
2 ≥ 4Σx4
Then, applying a theorem on stochastic stability (see Theorem 3.3, Section 4.3 p. 121 in [12]),
we see that
lim sup
t→∞
1
t
ln | x(t) |≤ −
(
Σ−K −
Σ
2
)
which guarantees that the trivial solution x = 0 is almost surely exponentially stable if Σ >
K + Σ2 . 
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Example 2. Consider the stochastic risk selection scheme
dǫS = −f1(PS − PB) + σ1(PS − PB)dW (t)
dǫB = f2(PS − PB) + σ2(PS − PB)dW (t)
where f1 > 0, f2 > 0.
The properties of the price functions PS(ǫS) and PB(ǫB) guarantee that the conditions of
Proposition 4.2 hold so that convergence to the single price PS(ǫS) = PB(ǫB) is obtained.
Similar results may be obtained for the other dynamical schemes proposed above in the
presence of noise. Many of these schemes may be turned into stochastic schemes and their long
time behaviour can be studied using results from stochastic stability theory (see e.g. [5]). We
intend to provide further results on this problem in future work.
5. Conclusion
In this work we address the question of price formation in incomplete markets. We elaborate
within the framework of a one period discrete model so that the concepts and the ideas behind
price formation will be highlighted and the technical details will be kept to a minimum. Then
the passage to a multiperiod model should be straightforward and we plan to present it in future
work together with the case of the continuous model.
It is well known that in an incomplete markets setting, if equivalent martingale measures exist,
they are not unique. Therefore, this leads to more than one possible price, all of which consistent
with the absence of arbitrage arguments. Other criteria will therefore be needed in order to select
the price at which a particular asset is traded in an incomplete market. Several criteria have
been proposed in the literature for the selection of the measure chosen to price a particular
asset in an incomplete market, the majority of which is based, to the best of our knowledge, on
the minimization of entropy related functions. Such functions quantify the “distance” between
the true statistical measure of the market and the equivalent martingale measure chosen by the
agents in the market.
In this paper we have chosen to take an alternative route and propose three different, but
ultimately related, scenarios for the price selection in incomplete markets. All scenarios assume
that the participating agents have some initial beliefs about the distribution of the future states
of the world. Based on these beliefs, each of them has in mind an initial non-arbitrage valuation
of the contingent claim, according to which no risk is assumed utility-wise. However, these initial
valuations do not coincide in general.
The first scenario is a market game where the buyer and the seller bargain on the price of the
contingent claim and choose the bargaining strategy that minimizes maximum regret. Given
their initial valuations, this mechanism offers a unique bargaining strategy, that will lead to at
most one unique price (depending on their initial valuations).
The second scenario which leads to a unique price for the asset is based on the concept of
risk sharing. In this scenario we assume that each of the agents has firm beliefs about the
future prices of the world, but deliberately undertakes some risk so that the transaction will
be made possible. The unique price of the asset is defined by the solution of the optimization
problem, in which the risk undertaken by each agent is chosen so that a convex combination
of the risks undertaken by the agents is minimized, under the constraint that the transaction
is made possible, i.e. under the constraint that the buyer’s price is greater or equal than the
seller’s price.
The third scenario models the situation where the two agents do not have firm beliefs about
the future states of the world but they are willing to update their beliefs as part of the bargaining
procedure. Their quoted prices thus do not entail any risk but there is some potential loss, to
which we call regret in this work. The potential loss for agent 1 comes about from not being
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able to persuade agent 2 to accept her original beliefs (that would lead to the best possible price
for her) and similarly for agent 2.
In the third scenario a unique price is chosen by the solution of the optimization problem in
which the beliefs are chosen so that the convex combination of the regrets of the two agents is
minimized under the constraint that the transaction eventually takes place.
These three scenarios offer plausible ways in which prices may be chosen in an incomplete
market. This first part of our analysis deals with the static problem of specifying which price is
finally selected.
The second part of the paper deals with the proposal of dynamic mechanisms that will lead
the agents to the price at which the contingent claim is traded. This section is more general in
the sense that we study general dynamic mechanisms that will lead to a common price between
buyer and seller, which may or may not be the one proposed in the three scenarios of part one.
These dynamical mechanisms are reminiscent of the Walras tattoˆnement scenario in general
equilibrium considerations and add to the general literature on how markets are led to their
“equilibrium” states. In this section arguments from the theory of dynamical systems are used
to provide general schemes that will lead to a common price for the asset. The stability of these
mechanisms is studied as well as their robustness with respect to random perturbations.
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